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CONFLICT OF LAWS: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW
RESTATEMENT RULE AS APPLIED BY FOURTH
CIRCUIT
THE TRADITIONAL approach to conflict of laws problems has been
strongly criticized in recent years.' In Lowe's No. Wilkesboro
Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, rejecting a traditional choice of law rule,
chose to apply a rule of the proposed Restatement in reaching its
decision. This rule states that the local law of the state having
the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties determines their rights and liabilities. 3 The result reached
in Lowe's suggests a need for a different type of approach in ana-
lyzing conflicts problems.
Plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, applied to defendant, a
Pennsylvania corporation, for a 200,000 dollar insurance policy on
the life of plaintiff's president. The application was submitted to de-
fendant's home office in Pennsylvania but was not acted upon until
five days after its receipt. 4 The defendant then rejected the applica-
tion for a 200,000 dollar policy, and instead, issued a 50,000 dollar
policy. The latter policy was delivered to plaintiff's agent in Wash-
ington, who requested that an attempt be made to procure an in-
crease in the amount of coverage. Before any action was taken on this
request, the proposed insured died. Plaintiff instituted suit alleging
that defendant had been negligent in its failure to act within a
reasonable time on the application for the 200,000 dollar policy.
I See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942);
Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig,
The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CoaNELL L.Q. 215 (1963); Yntema, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
- 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963).
REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
'The vice-president in charge of underwriting was the only person in the home
office who was authorized to approve applications for over $100,000; he left on an
out-of-town trip the day before the final part of the multi-part application was
received. Trying unsuccessfully for four days to reach him, the underwriting officer
in the home office was powerless to act on the application during that period. 319
F.2d at 471.
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The district court, bound to apply North Carolina law,8 held
that under state conflicts decisions the traditional rule of lex loci
delictus would govern.6 Determining that Pennsylvania was the
place of wrong, the court dismissed the suit on the ground that no
cause of action existed under Pennsylvania law.7
The Court of Appeals, however, held that there were no North
Carolina conflicts decisions determining which state's law would
govern the merits of the case.8 Consequently, the court applied a
choice of law rule which it considered to be a more flexible approach
to the solution of conflicts problems9-the "significant relationship"
5 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 206 F. Supp. 427, 428 (M.D.N.C. 1962). The district court based its decision on
Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931). There the court said: "The
actionable quality of the defendants' conduct.., must be determined by the law of
the place where the injury was done...." Id. at 576, 158 S.E. at 102.
7The court cited Shipley v. Ohio Natl Life Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Pa.
1961); Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34 (1940). Under
Pennsylvania law there is no cause of action for negligent delay unless it arises ex
contractu.8The court based its decision upon a rather narrow interpretation of North
Carolina law. It held that the conflicts rule of lex loci delictus applied only to
personal injury actions wherein the wrongful conduct and the injury occurred in the
same state. Such was the situation in Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101
(1931). Thus the court was able to distinguish it from the instant case.
The rule of lex loci delictus has been applied in other North Carolina personal
injury cases where the injury and conduct occurred in the same state but never
where they occurred in different states. See, e.g., Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360,
26 S.E.2d 911 (1943); Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933); Hipps v.
Southern Ry., 177 N.C. 472, 99 S.E. 335 (1919); Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
168 N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915).
More recently, in Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), 1963 DUKE L.J.
537, the North Carolina court again applied the traditional choice of law rule of
lex loci delictus instead of the suggested lex domicilii in an intersnouml immunity
case (where the conduct and injury occurred in the same state), saying: "We do
not deem it wise to voyage into such an uncharted sea, leaving behind well
established conflict of laws rules." Id. at 616, 129 S.E.2d at 293.
9 319 F.2d at 472-73. The court said that although there were no North Carolina
cases in point, it was nevertheless required to determine and to apply the rule that
the North Carolina court would choose were it hearing the case. However, the court
said it could find little indication from North Carolina decisions how North Carolina
might decide this case. Then it discredited the few guidelines it did find: "Thus,
favored with few guides and observing that even the validity of these is obscured
by substantial criticism, we find it most reasonable, in these circumstances, to avoid
a rigid rule and to pursue instead a more flexible approach...." 319 F.2d at 473.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), sharply limited the discretion of a
federal court to determine for itself what law should be applied in a diversity of
citizenship case. "Federal courts have.., used their discretion where questions have
arisen in the ascertainment of the state's common law. If there are no decisions
exactly in point, relevant data in the shape of analogous decisions which afford a
reasonably satisfactory basis for a conclusion as to the state law should be followed
.... The federal court must consider related decisions, analogies, and any reliable
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rule.10 Concluding that Pennsylvania had the most significant
relationship with the case, the court affirmed the dismissal by the
district court.
Under the significant relationship rule as set forth in the pro-
posed Restatement, courts must apply the law of the place which
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. In
tort cases, the Restatement lists a hierarchy of contacts which are
considered important: (1) place of injury; (2) place of conduct;
(3) domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between
the parties centered." As a general rule, if the injury occurs in a
single, ascertainable state that contact will be given the greatest
weight; if not, then the place where the wrongful conduct occurs
will be considered most heavily. When the injury and conduct both
occur in the same state, then almost invariably those contacts will
be given greatest weight.'2 The importance of the other factors will
vary according to the nature of the interests involved. The nature
data tending convincingly to show what the state law is." IA MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.30 9 [2], at 3328 (2d ed. 1961). (Emphasis added.)
The cases cited note 8 supra, though distinguished from the present case by the
Court of Appeals, are quite analogous. From these cases it would appear that the
North Carolina court is steadfast in its retention of the traditional rule of lex loci
delictus and would apply it in the present case, the factual distinction and the North
Carolina statute cited note 24 infra notwithstanding.10 What is now the significant relationship rule was first applied as the "grouping
of contacts" theory in Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp.
4 (App. T. 1936). The court defined the theory as the grouping of various elements,
such as place of injury and place of wrong, which are related to the case and which
are an indication of the law that was intended to govern. Where the various elements
seemingly dictate an inconsistent conclusion, those which are deemed "controlling"
govern. (One of the shortcomings of the case was that it failed to list criteria by
which to determine which elements are "controlling.')
The court in Jones was strongly influenced by the British theory that the
"proper law" shall govern. The "proper law" is that system of law by which the
parties intend to bind themselves. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 214-15
(6th ed. 1961).
The rule was later applied in Auten v. Auten, 808 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99
(1954), where the New York court in determining rights and obligations under a
contract refused to apply automatically either the law of the place of its making or
the law of the place of performance. The court said that although this rule
afforded less certainty and predictability than the traditional rule, its advantage was
that it gave the place having the most interest in the dispute paramount control
over the issues and outcome of the case. 808 N.Y. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
The "grouping of contacts" theory has also been referred to as the "center of
gravity" theory, and now in the Restatement as the significant relationship rule.
Basically, the difference between them is in name only. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 174, at 463-64 (1962).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
22 Id. comment e.
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of the interests of two or more states and the weight to be accorded
them will depend on: (1) the issues involved; (2) the nature of
the tort involved; (3) the basic purpose of the tort rule involved;
and (4) the possibility of recovery on some other theory.'8
The Court of Appeals decided that Lowe's could best be ad-
judicated by application of the significant relationship rule. Yet
the court failed to state where the injury occurred 4 and thereby
avoided the contact afforded the greatest weight by the Restate-
ment.15 It also discounted the fact that plaintiff was a North Caro-
lina corporation and the proposed insured was a North Carolina
resident.' 6 The court determined that the wrongful conduct oc-
curred in Pennsylvania and stated flatly that the most important
events upon which liability would rest occurred there.'7
The result reached in this case illustrates a major weakness in
the approach of the proposed Restatement. It has established a
hierarchy of contacts which the courts are to follow but has provided
no adequate means by which the courts can judge the relative
significance of each of these contacts in a specific case. For example,
the Restatement says that the place of injury is to be considered
18 RESTA-rEMENT (SECOND), CONFLiCr OF LAWS § 379 and comments thereto (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1963). See also Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. Rv. 1212, 1253 (1963).
14 "It is of course true that, in addition to the defendant's conduct complained of,
an injury must be shown to have resulted before tort liability can arise. It does not
follow, however, that because plaintiff was domiciled in North Carolina and Buchan
[the proposed insured] lived and died there, the tort complained of happened in
that state. It would seem to make no difference in this case if Buchan had died
elsewhere." 319 F.2d at 474. Perhaps the court was implying that the injury (as
well as the wrongful conduct) occurred in Pennsylvania.
The insurance applied for was to be used by plaintiff as collateral for a loan
which it was negotiating. Thus the injury resulting from the defendant's alleged
wrongful conduct seemingly was the financial loss to the plaintiff of $150,000 collateral.
Since the loss of collateral affected a North Carolina corporation, it is suggested
that the place of injury was North Carolina.
25See note 14 supra. The court avoided stating explicitly where the injury oc-
curred. It seemingly could and should have done so.
16 "Scarcely can the mere fact that the proposed insured lived in North Carolina
be highly significant. This circumstance is reduced almost to the point of irrelevancy
in comparison with the events which occurred in Pennsylvania. And while the
domicile of the plaintiff corporation merits consideration, it cannot be accorded
dominant importance in fixing the location of the tort." 319 F.2d at 474.
17 319 F.2d at 474. The court listed the following contacts as controlling: "It is
to the home office of defendant in Pennsylvania that the application was sent; all
information relative to the policy was obtained through or sent to the Pennsylvania
office. Only there could an application for a policy of the size desired be acted upon;
and in that place the application was rejected and an offer of a $50,000 policy made."
Id.
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most heavily;' 8 yet the court in Lowe's determined other contacts to
be more significant in this particular case. How did the court
arrive at this conclusion? Because there is very little guidance in
the Restatement, courts are left more or less on their own to decide
as they see fit.19 This discretion given to the courts may lead to
less than satisfactory results in some cases; Lowe's is an example.
It appears that a new set of arbitrary rules have merely been substi-
tuted for the old ones with the disadvantage of more difficult ap-
plication.
Another approach to the solution of conflicts problems, govern-
mental-interest analysis,20 has been suggested. When applied to the
Lowe's case, governmental-interest analysis offers an interesting
contrast to the Restatement rule.
It should be noted that in allowing or prohibiting a cause of
action for negligent delay, different states have expressed different
reasons for their decisions.21  North Carolina's policy is to protect
28 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Bogen v. Bogen, 219
N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941). Though the facts of these cases were similar, the
place of domicile was less important in the latter than in the former.
10 Professor Reese, one of the draftsmen of the Restatement, in commenting on
the new rule, said: "The relative interests of two or more states in having their law
applied will inevitably depend upon the precise issue presented, the facts of the case,
and the relationship of these facts and the parties to the states involved. The court
is the body best equipped to deal with such variables on a case by case basis.... By
requiring the courts, at least in the areas of torts and contracts, to tailor their
rules to the precise issues involved, the opinion lays the proper basis for the eventual
development of a considerable number of relatively narrow choice-of-law rules. Only
rules of this type can prove successful in practice. Once they have been developed,
the advantages of predictability of result can be enjoyed." Reese, supra note 13,
at 1253-54.
"According to this theory, as developed by Professor Currie, a court faced with
a choice of laws problem would examine the policies of the respective states and
determine which of them has a legitimate interest in having its policy applied under
the circumstances of the particular case. If only one state has such an interest, then
its law should be applied. If more than one state has an interest, and the policies
of those states conflict, then there would be a "real conflict." In that case, according
to Professor Currie, the court should apply the law of the forum state rather than
subordinate its own legitimate interest to that of a foreign state. See notes 28 and 30
infra.
See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLUMr. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963); Currie, The Disinterested Third State,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754 (1963); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in
New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automa-
tion in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958). For the most succinct
statement of the theory see Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict
of Laws, 1959 Dusi L.J. 171, 178.
"1 See generally Comment, Tort Liability of Insurance Company For Negligent
Delay in Processing Applications, 15 ALA. L. Rxv. 157 (1962); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d
487 (1953).
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its citizens from the negligence of an insurance company, either
foreign or domestic, in failing to act upon an application within a
reasonable time. The policy is expressed in two leading cases and
is reinforced by statute. In Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co.,22
the North Carolina court ruled against an insurance company for
its alleged negligent delay in delivering a policy to the insured.
The court talked in terms of a legal duty owed by the insurer to
the plaintiff to conduct its affairs so as not to injure another. In
Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co.,23 the court held the defendant
company liable for its alleged negligent failure to procure a policy
for the plaintiff as promised. The basis for liability was the "trust
and confidence" imposed in the defendant by the proposed insured.
There is a North Carolina statute24 which provides that all contracts
of insurance made on lives, property, or interests in the state are
deemed to be made within the state; and all contracts for insurance,
the applications for which are taken within the state, are deemed
to be made within the state and are subject to its laws. The North
Carolina court has specifically recognized that the policy underlying
this statute is the protection of the citizens of the state doing busi-
ness with foreign corporations. 25 Furthermore, there are decisions
which imply that foreign law probably would not be applied in
derogation of this policy if considered prejudicial to the public
interest.2 6
On the other hand, Pennsylvania clearly has the policy of pro-
tecting insurance companies from claims not arising ex contractu.
The Pennsylvania court has stated 27 that unless a legal duty to act
falls upon the company independently of statute or contract, the
company cannot be held liable for its failure to act. The court
pointed out that the law imposes on no person a general duty to
act to save others from harm; rather an affirmative legal obligation
to act exists only in certain specific situations. Thus no cause of
action for negligent delay exists in Pennsylvania.
22 185 N.C. 121, 116 S.E. 266, approved, 186 N.C. 763, 119 S.E. 172 (1923).
23 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).
24 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28 (1960).
25 Williams v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ins. Co., 145 N.C. 128, 132, 58 S.E. 802,
803 (1907).
20 See, e.g., Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 289, 171 S.E. 82, 83 (1933); Rodwell v.
Camel City Coach Co., 205 N.C. 292, 171 S.E. 100 (1933); Howard v. Howard, 200
N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
27 See Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 430-33, 13 A.2d 34,
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If the Court of Appeals had used governmental-interest analysis,
it would have discovered not only that the laws of North Carolina
and Pennsylvania differ but also that the underlying policies of
the two conflict. Realizing this, it would have applied North
Carolina law.2s
Governmental-interest analysis has been criticized for this arbi-
trary application of the forum state's law whenever a true conflict is
found.29 But whether or not one accepts this method as the final
step in making the choice of law,30 the analytical aspect of the theory
provides two things lacking in the proposed Restatement rule. In
the first place, it offers a definite approach to choice of law problems
in contrast to the search for the "most significant relationship."
Secondly, it exposes the false conflict so that a state need not un-
wittingly subordinate its own legitimate interests where no other
state has a real interest in having its law applied to the contro-
versy.31 For these reasons32 governmental-interest analysis seems
to be the better candidate to replace the discredited traditional
rules.
36-38 (1940). Accord, Shipley v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Pa.
1961).
28 Under governmental-interest analysis, when a court encounters a true conflict,
it must apply the law of the forum. Professor Currie has stated: "A conflicts problem
does not arise merely because a statement of the facts of the case requires mention of
two states. [Nor does it arise merely because the laws of the two states are different.]
A true problem arises only when the laws of two or more states are in conflict, in the
sense that each state has an interest in the application of its distinctive legal policy."
Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 38. See articles
cited, supra note 20.
Here North Carolina, the forum state, has an interest in the assertion of its
policy, for North Carolina citizens, who are the beneficial objects of the policy, are
involved.
" See, e.g., Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
"Another approach which might be used is to apply the law which reaches the
better result or to give effect to that policy which, in the opinion of the court, is
stronger. In many cases, however, where there is no true conflict, this problem will
not arise.
OlAccording to the Restatement hierarchy of contacts, as under the traditional
system, if the place of injury and the place of the wrongful conduct are in the same
state, the law of that state would be applied even though it had no real interest in
applying its law under the circumstances. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
"2 Moreover, it would seem that the result from a governmental-interest approach
would be at least as predictable as the result from application of the significant
relationship test. The former would involve construction of state policies and a
subsequent arbitrary choice of law in the real conflict situation, while the latter
is based on the court's subjective appraisal of the various "contacts" involved.
Vol. 1964: 377]
